In support, one might envision the intellectual monoculture of (Harvard?) to be a place that actively suppresses 'Thought mutations'. This might be comparable to a genetic universe that has no spontaneous mutations. No path or abilty for the system to adapt to environmental reality via 'selection'. No evolution... and a serious danger of extinction.
Thanks. I like testing the limits of applicability for Natural Selection. Of course, 'ideas' are only vulnerable to reality's consequences (and selection) after they prompt action or lack thereof in a naturally competitive arena. There are considerable swathes of society from Ivory Towers to conspiratorial cliques that can avoid testing ... and maybe even defy entropy.
an ivory tower must necessarily have someone or something protecting it: something that defends it from the outside and the consequences of its nonsense.
if it exports entropy for too long, it will erode the orderly structures protecting it, necessary to defend it and keep it alive. eventually it too will succumb to its entropy dumping by destroying its surroundings to the point it too gets destroyed. there is no escape from entropy, the feedback loop is just extended in certain circumstances.
About 55 years ago, in a Philosophy course, we examined Roseau’s “Tabula Rasa” theory that held that everyone is born with no Jung-Ian hard-wiring (like primordial archetypes). The theory being that behavior was learned. Bad boys were not born that way, instead, they learned by observing other Bad boys and new tracks were laid-down on their brain’s “tabula.” The class used the book “Lord of the Flies” to take sides on Roseau’s theory. Of course, we never resolved the issue. I resolved it personally after studying universal archetypes (ascent, descent, journey, water, etc) in Literature, some which the readers observed but the author denied.
I love the correlation between immaculate conception and the blank slate. I am reminded also of the south park episode ‘the goobacks’, about the time travelling immigrants from the future who all look the same, all differences disappearing through centuries of intermixing.
And then the blank canvas from different artistic perspectives, some seeing the canvas as completely determined by their mark making, others may consider the canvas a threshold with latent possibilities anchored by history, material. The former reminds me of old stories where the woman/mother was seen as passive vessel and the life was determined completely by the male ‘seed’.
I think the biofoundationalist canvas is a better one
in some ways it's a kind of adaptive fiction. it's useful at the personal level to believe you can be anything if you try, because hopefully it motivates you to be the best that you can. but taken to the level of national faith, so married to the fiction you create laws and political doctrines around it... corrosive.
I like this entire framework, in the sense that I find it thought-provoking. I am not sure I agree with it at all however, so I will give you my intuitively grounded fiery monologue pre-emptively and attempt engagement in greater detail later, if I find it morally possible, when I have finished reading everything. Here are, anyway, some thoughts:
If dyads are indeed *how we balance*, as you write, then it it is not clear to me what purpose *common morality* has in that framework: to reduce *un-necessary* conflict? To make different ”moral phenotypes” co-operate, at least sometimes? To create strategic ambiguity? If such common morality is only construct, sham, less real or ”superstructure” (but also necessary for interacting with other potentially hostile dyads) then does that not imply some limitations on the value of your framework within your own analysis? If the commonality of morality is just an illusion shared by all phenotype-groups for the purpose of promoting their own interests, does that not imply that all engagements with morality need to wear such clothes, and that what you are doing is — by your own logic — to abolish or weaken this constructive dynamic between dyadically opposite phenotypes? Is that good?
This brings me to the second point. I am also guarded towards adopting Haidts moral foundations as they are.
To illustrate my point, I think beauty has moral value. Why should it not? To call it ”purity” would be to put it in a Procrustean bed: beauty is not necessarily about purity, although it often is, to simply think of that is to lock in your mind in very culturally-specific priors, conditioned by problems of hygiene more than beauty.
I also think practicality has moral value: what works, works, and is therefore both real — if it is good and practical, you know that it is *really* good. To value practicality is a generative act, it commits you to valuing life, existence and those kinds of values which harmonize with existence rather than running from it. In this sense it is an act of generational goodness.
Thirdly, I think love is good. To really love someone or something is both act of strength, in that it forces you to be strong enough to endure the possibility of betrayal — and thus, only such forms of love can, indeed, survive; it has the added indirect benefit of orienting your own actions towards actions which are constructive; it creates positive network effects, as it allows us to co-operate with others from a position of goodwill, allows us to form relationships that are meaningful, where we see person and not mechanism to be manipulated, and gives us the same benefit.
Haidts use of the term ’morality’ (and yours, by extension) mirror an analytical drift-of-concept which seems to have occurred in the 20th century, where instead of referring to orthopraxy, ’Moral’ is some kind of distribution between ’Good’ and ’Bad’ that is just used descriptively (contrast this usage with that implied in a phrasing like ”Commodus is not a moral man, Maximus.” — what are the implications?).
In short, what you are describing is morality and deviation, not different ’forms’ of morality, for such forms cannot exist. Yes, the imperfect deviations have value in that they refine humanity and keep us from degenerating into decadent disgusting blobs, but it *is not* the good.
Edit: Indeed, when I attempt to think more deeply at the implications of your own framework, that seems to be what you are saying!
"Neanderthals aren't around anymore because they lost to the more empathetic brain"?
The self-congratulatory cognitive dissonance on display makes me feel embarrassed for this person and also highly frightened of the self-proclaimed empathetic people he sides with. "Empathy can and will destroy all of your competition"? These people are insane and dangerous.
what's 'insane and dangerous' is thinking having some empathy means you must be consumed by it. yes, it is beneficial for a human collective to have *some* empathy for those in society; a hierarchy benefits when all layers are healthy. it's a matter of degree and how parochial it is.
In support, one might envision the intellectual monoculture of (Harvard?) to be a place that actively suppresses 'Thought mutations'. This might be comparable to a genetic universe that has no spontaneous mutations. No path or abilty for the system to adapt to environmental reality via 'selection'. No evolution... and a serious danger of extinction.
I like this framing
Thanks. I like testing the limits of applicability for Natural Selection. Of course, 'ideas' are only vulnerable to reality's consequences (and selection) after they prompt action or lack thereof in a naturally competitive arena. There are considerable swathes of society from Ivory Towers to conspiratorial cliques that can avoid testing ... and maybe even defy entropy.
an ivory tower must necessarily have someone or something protecting it: something that defends it from the outside and the consequences of its nonsense.
if it exports entropy for too long, it will erode the orderly structures protecting it, necessary to defend it and keep it alive. eventually it too will succumb to its entropy dumping by destroying its surroundings to the point it too gets destroyed. there is no escape from entropy, the feedback loop is just extended in certain circumstances.
About 55 years ago, in a Philosophy course, we examined Roseau’s “Tabula Rasa” theory that held that everyone is born with no Jung-Ian hard-wiring (like primordial archetypes). The theory being that behavior was learned. Bad boys were not born that way, instead, they learned by observing other Bad boys and new tracks were laid-down on their brain’s “tabula.” The class used the book “Lord of the Flies” to take sides on Roseau’s theory. Of course, we never resolved the issue. I resolved it personally after studying universal archetypes (ascent, descent, journey, water, etc) in Literature, some which the readers observed but the author denied.
I enjoyed reading that. blank slatism in different shapes over time.
Can you share which Philosopher took Roseau’s “tableau rasa” term and issued the term “blank slatism” ?
Never saw the term before your post. Whole lot of Latin & French terms have crept into the English usage.
I love the correlation between immaculate conception and the blank slate. I am reminded also of the south park episode ‘the goobacks’, about the time travelling immigrants from the future who all look the same, all differences disappearing through centuries of intermixing.
And then the blank canvas from different artistic perspectives, some seeing the canvas as completely determined by their mark making, others may consider the canvas a threshold with latent possibilities anchored by history, material. The former reminds me of old stories where the woman/mother was seen as passive vessel and the life was determined completely by the male ‘seed’.
I think the biofoundationalist canvas is a better one
in some ways it's a kind of adaptive fiction. it's useful at the personal level to believe you can be anything if you try, because hopefully it motivates you to be the best that you can. but taken to the level of national faith, so married to the fiction you create laws and political doctrines around it... corrosive.
and thank you <3
I like this entire framework, in the sense that I find it thought-provoking. I am not sure I agree with it at all however, so I will give you my intuitively grounded fiery monologue pre-emptively and attempt engagement in greater detail later, if I find it morally possible, when I have finished reading everything. Here are, anyway, some thoughts:
If dyads are indeed *how we balance*, as you write, then it it is not clear to me what purpose *common morality* has in that framework: to reduce *un-necessary* conflict? To make different ”moral phenotypes” co-operate, at least sometimes? To create strategic ambiguity? If such common morality is only construct, sham, less real or ”superstructure” (but also necessary for interacting with other potentially hostile dyads) then does that not imply some limitations on the value of your framework within your own analysis? If the commonality of morality is just an illusion shared by all phenotype-groups for the purpose of promoting their own interests, does that not imply that all engagements with morality need to wear such clothes, and that what you are doing is — by your own logic — to abolish or weaken this constructive dynamic between dyadically opposite phenotypes? Is that good?
This brings me to the second point. I am also guarded towards adopting Haidts moral foundations as they are.
To illustrate my point, I think beauty has moral value. Why should it not? To call it ”purity” would be to put it in a Procrustean bed: beauty is not necessarily about purity, although it often is, to simply think of that is to lock in your mind in very culturally-specific priors, conditioned by problems of hygiene more than beauty.
I also think practicality has moral value: what works, works, and is therefore both real — if it is good and practical, you know that it is *really* good. To value practicality is a generative act, it commits you to valuing life, existence and those kinds of values which harmonize with existence rather than running from it. In this sense it is an act of generational goodness.
Thirdly, I think love is good. To really love someone or something is both act of strength, in that it forces you to be strong enough to endure the possibility of betrayal — and thus, only such forms of love can, indeed, survive; it has the added indirect benefit of orienting your own actions towards actions which are constructive; it creates positive network effects, as it allows us to co-operate with others from a position of goodwill, allows us to form relationships that are meaningful, where we see person and not mechanism to be manipulated, and gives us the same benefit.
Haidts use of the term ’morality’ (and yours, by extension) mirror an analytical drift-of-concept which seems to have occurred in the 20th century, where instead of referring to orthopraxy, ’Moral’ is some kind of distribution between ’Good’ and ’Bad’ that is just used descriptively (contrast this usage with that implied in a phrasing like ”Commodus is not a moral man, Maximus.” — what are the implications?).
In short, what you are describing is morality and deviation, not different ’forms’ of morality, for such forms cannot exist. Yes, the imperfect deviations have value in that they refine humanity and keep us from degenerating into decadent disgusting blobs, but it *is not* the good.
Edit: Indeed, when I attempt to think more deeply at the implications of your own framework, that seems to be what you are saying!
"Neanderthals aren't around anymore because they lost to the more empathetic brain"?
The self-congratulatory cognitive dissonance on display makes me feel embarrassed for this person and also highly frightened of the self-proclaimed empathetic people he sides with. "Empathy can and will destroy all of your competition"? These people are insane and dangerous.
what's 'insane and dangerous' is thinking having some empathy means you must be consumed by it. yes, it is beneficial for a human collective to have *some* empathy for those in society; a hierarchy benefits when all layers are healthy. it's a matter of degree and how parochial it is.