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Dmitry's avatar

> “What about places like Saudia Arabia? They’re rich and not liberal!”

I’ve mentioned the Saudis within Biofoundationalist framing before on a podcast; they’re not a counterexample, in fact they’re another illustration of it happening.

even in religiously strict, ultra-conservative places like Saudia Arabia, this abundance-style liberalizing phenomena is occurring.

Saudi Arabia is vastly more liberal than it *comparatively* was a couple decades ago (I’ll break this down in a future essay, there are many examples). the comparisons to see the liberalizing effects with wealth are to be made to a country’s *current* values and *past* values (expressed through the political), and then compare the environment over that timeline.

SA is way more liberal than it once was and is only getting moreso. the liberalizing effect is seen within the context of *the same nation over time*; not by making some arbitrary comparison to say Sweden-style social policies then saying “look it’s still conservative compared to Scandinavia so it’s not liberal!”. that’s not the point, it is getting much more liberal relative to what it once was, and abundance has every bit to do with it.

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Dmitry's avatar

a series of clarifying comments:

> "The parties move around over time and don't have fixed values. This refutes the dyad claims behind Biofoundationalism"

remarks to past Biofoundationalism essays have mentioned how political parties shift and don't espouse the same values over time. republicans today don't believe the same thing as republicans of yesteryear. the tories aren't really "conservative" anymore, etc.. yes, very true!

and this is precisely my point: political platforms have become more left/liberal over time in an environment where you should expect them to do so (this includes leftwing parties, which are also more liberal). this is why conservatism is described as "the speed limit of liberalism in wealthy environments" in Part IV. you need to look at these trends over 10-15+ year timelines, not 1-2. we are discussing deep macro behavioral patterns, not the past couple elections.

you'll note I use the terms 'conservative/liberal' and not 'republican/democrat' or other political branding.

--> when you point out how rightwing parties have different values compared to yesteryear, you are not observing conservatism changing, you are simply observing "the degree that rightwing parties can actually be conservative is diminishing in an increasingly decadent environment". this is entirely consistent with Biofoundationalism, in fact it's one of the core points of Part IV. <--

this is why I don't discuss these concepts on political party grounds. parties can call themselves whatever they want, what matters is the morality they're selling and the degree to which they can sell it.

the parties are prone to shifting over time, and the more instability/hardship an environment has, the less liberal the "liberal" parties will be. the richer/safer the country, the less conservative the "conservative" parties will be! again, over ~10-year timelines. this will be deconstructed more methodically with examples in Part V.

at macro scale: in times of hardship both parties will veer right; in sustained decadence both will creep left. we colloquially refer to this as the Overton Window. the long-term trend is a function of the utility that a certain morality offers in a given environment.

the country’s governance has to be reasonably democratic/non-tyrannical for this to occur. if the population is physically disallowed from expressing their temperamental morality (voting)…. well then yeah, they can’t express it. violence can suppress a hell of a lot of things. that doesn’t refute anything Biofoundationalism is saying.

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